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Abstract—We propose a simple yet complete lattice-based
scheme for secret key generation from Gaussian sources in the
presence of an eavesdropper, and show that it achieves strong
secret key rates up to 1/2 nat from the optimal in the case of
“degraded” source models. The novel ingredient of our scheme
is a lattice-hashing technique, based on the notions of flatness
factor and channel intrinsic randomness. The proposed scheme
does not require dithering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key generation at the physical layer was first inves-
tigated by Maurer [1] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2], who
showed that correlated observations of noisy phenomena could
be used to distill secret keys by exchanging information over
a public channel. Most existing secret key generation schemes
rely heavily on the assumption of discrete random sources over
finite or countable alphabets. In order to apply these techniques
to wireless communications, it is necessary to extend the
key generation framework to the case of continuous sources,
such as Gaussian sources [3, 4]. In [4], the authors study a
multi-terminal scenario for secret key generation in the special
case where the eavesdropper only has access to the public
channel. Beside providing a characterization of the optimal
strong secret key rate, they show that this optimal rate can
be achieved using lattice codes (for information reconciliation
only).
In this paper, we consider secret key generation between two
terminals, Alice and Bob, who observe correlated Gaussian
sequences Xn and Yn, in the presence of an eavesdropper,
Eve, who also obtains a correlated sequence Zn. For the sake
of simplicity, we suppose that a single round of unidirectional
public communication takes place in order to establish the
key. Our main contribution is to show that, in the case of a
“degraded” source model, a secret key rate up to half a nat
from the optimal can be achieved by a complete lattice-coding
scheme considerably different from and much simpler than [4].
Typically, secret key generation is composed of two distinct
procedures: information reconciliation, in which public mes-
sages are exchanged to ensure that Alice and Bob can construct
the same data sequence with vanishing error probability, and
privacy amplification to extract from this shared sequence
a secret key which is statistically independent from Eve’s
observation and from the public messages.
Privacy amplification and randomness extraction: Our pri-
vacy amplification strategy is based on the concept of channel
intrinsic randomness, or the maximum bit rate that can be
extracted from a channel output independently of its input [5–
7]). We begin by considering a simplified scenario in which
Bob and Alice share the same variable Xn. In this case,
the amount of randomness which can be extracted from Xn
independently of Zn is precisely the maximum available secret
key rate. We propose a lattice-hashing technique to extract
the randomness, by reducing the source modulo a suitable
lattice. Although our main objective in this paper is to solve the
problem of privacy amplification, our lattice-hashing technique
is also an intriguing result in its own right, which could have
other applications.
The flatness factor: Furthermore, we provide a quantitative
characterization of the class of lattices which are good for
randomness extraction, which is based on a computable pa-
rameter, the flatness factor, as a function of the eavesdropper’s
noise variance. The concept of flatness factor relates to the
properties of Gaussian measures on lattices, and was first
introduced in [8] in the context of physical-layer network
coding. In [9], two of the authors also showed the relevance
of the flatness factor for secrecy and introduced the notion of
secrecy-good lattices for the wiretap channel. In this paper,
we show that this class of lattices is also suitable for secret
key generation.
Information reconciliation and Wyner-Ziv coding: Our strat-
egy for information reconciliation follows the outline of [3, 4]:
first, the source Xn is vector quantized; then, a public message
is generated in the manner of Wyner-Ziv coding, so that Bob
can decode the quantized variable using the sequence Yn
as side information. The existence of good nested lattices
for Wyner-Ziv coding has been established in [10] (see also
[11, 12]). We show that this construction is compatible with
the secrecy-goodness property to conclude our existence proof.
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we provide basic definitions about lattices and introduce the
flatness factor, which allows to define the notion of secrecy-
good lattices. In Section III, we focus on the extraction of
channel intrinsic randomness over Gaussian channels using
lattice hashing. In Section IV, we introduce the Gaussian
source model and describe our lattice-based secret key gen-
eration scheme. The existence of sequences of nested lattices
satisfying the required conditions is shown in Section V.
II. LATTICES AND FLATNESS FACTOR
In this section, we introduce the mathematical tools we use
to describe and analyze our proposed scheme.
An n-dimensional lattice Λ in the Euclidean space Rn is
the discrete set defined by
Λ = L (B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn}
where the columns of the basis matrix B = [b1 · · ·bn] are
linearly independent.
A measurable setR(Λ) ⊂ Rn is called a fundamental region
of the lattice Λ if the disjoint union ∪λ∈Λ(R(Λ) + λ) = Rn.
Examples of fundamental regions include the fundamental
parallelepiped P(Λ) and the Voronoi region V(Λ). All the
fundamental regions have equal volume V (Λ).
For a vector x, the modR(Λ) operation is defined by x 7→ x¯
where x¯ is the unique element of R(Λ) such that x¯− x ∈ Λ.
For simplicity, we write this operation as
x¯ = x modR(Λ). (1)
For any x ∈ Rn, the nearest-neighbor quantizer associated
with Λ is given by QΛ(x) = argminλ∈Λ ‖λ − x‖. Note that
x modV(Λ) = x−QΛ(x).
Suppose that Xn is an n-dimensional i.i.d. Gaussian random
variable of variance σ2 with distribution
fσ(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖x‖2
2σ2 ,
for x ∈ Rn. We consider the Λ-periodic function
fσ,Λ(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
∑
λ∈Λ
e−
‖x+λ‖2
2σ2 , (2)
for all x ∈ Rn. Observe that fσ,Λ restricted to R(Λ) is the
probability density of x¯.
Definition 1 (Flatness factor [9]). For a lattice Λ and for a
parameter σ, the flatness factor is defined by:
ǫΛ(σ) , max
x∈R(Λ)
|V (Λ)fσ,Λ(x)− 1|
In other words, ǫΛ(σ) characterizes the L∞ distance of
fσ,Λ(x) to the uniform distribution UR(Λ) over R(Λ).
The flatness factor can be computed from the theta series
ΘΛ of the lattice, using the identity [9]
ǫΛ(σ) =
(
γΛ(σ)
2π
)n
2
ΘΛ
(
1
2πσ2
)
− 1, (3)
γΛ(σ) =
V (Λ)
2
n
σ2 is the volume-to-noise ratio (VNR).
Remark 1. We have shown in [9] that ǫΛ is a monotonically
decreasing function, i.e., for σ < σ′, we have ǫΛ(σ′) ≤ ǫΛ(σ).
The notion of secrecy-goodness characterizes lattice se-
quences whose flatness factors vanish exponentially fast as
n→∞.
Definition 2 (Secrecy-good lattices [9]). A sequence of lattices
Λ(n) is secrecy-good if ǫΛ(n)(σ) = e−Ω(n) for all fixed
γΛ(n)(σ) < 2π.
In [9] we have proven the existence of sequences of secrecy-
good lattices as long as
γΛ(σ) < 2π. (4)
Remark 2. In fact, we can show a concentration result:
∀η > 0 there exists a mod-p lattice ensemble such that
lattice sequences from this ensemble are secrecy-good with
probability greater than 1− η (see [9, Appendix III]).
III. LATTICE HASHING FOR GAUSSIAN SOURCES
Consider now a source model for secret key generation with
public discussion, in the presence of an eavesdropper. For
simplicity, we first assume that Alice and Bob observe the
same i.i.d. Gaussian random variable Xn = Yn of variance σ2x
per dimension. Eve observes a correlated i.i.d. random variable
Zn. We assume that Xn and Zn are jointly Gaussian, according
to the following model
X
n = Zn +Wn, (5)
where Wn is an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random vector of
variance σ2 per dimension. We suppose that Wn and Zn are
independent.
Our aim is to extract from Xn a random number that is
almost uniform on R(Λ) and almost independent of Zn. To
do this, we apply the mod R(Λ) operation in Eq. (1). Then,
the conditional density of X¯n = Xn modR(Λ) given Zn is
pX¯n|Zn(x¯|z) =
∑
x: x¯=x modR(Λ)
pXn|Zn(x|z)
=
∑
x∈x¯+Λ
pXn|Zn(x|z) =
∑
λ∈Λ
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖x¯+λ−z‖2
2σ2
= fσ,Λ(x¯− z)1R(Λ)(x¯).
From the definition of the flatness factor, it then follows that
∀z ∈ Rn, ∀x¯ ∈ R(Λ),
∣∣∣∣pX¯n|Zn(x¯|z)− 1V (Λ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫΛ(σ)V (Λ) .
(6)
With a similar reasoning, we also find
pX¯n(x¯) = fσx,Λ(x¯)1R(Λ)(x¯)
and again by definition of the flatness factor, we find
∀x¯ ∈ R(Λ),
∣∣∣∣pX¯n(x¯)− 1V (Λ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫΛ(σx)V (Λ) . (7)
So, if the flatness factor is small, X¯n is almost uniformly
distributed over R(Λ), and also almost independent of Zn.
It is worth mentioning that unlike other works which use
dithering or the high-resolution assumption [10], we obtain
uniformity and independence from the flatness factor.
One can now bound the mutual information
I(X¯n;Zn) =
∫
Rn
∫
R(Λ)
pX¯nZn(x¯, z) log
pX¯n|Zn(x¯|z)
pX¯n(x¯)
dx¯dz
≤
∫
Rn
∫
R(Λ)
pX¯nZn(x¯, z) log
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
1− ǫΛ(σx)dx¯dz
= log (1 + ǫΛ(σ)) − log (1 − ǫΛ(σx)) ≤ ǫΛ(σ) + 2ǫΛ(σx)
if ǫΛ(σx) ≤ 12 . Since σx ≥ σ by Eq. (5), and recalling Remark
1, we have I(X¯n;Zn) ≤ 3ǫΛ(σ). The sufficient condition in
Eq. (4) for the existence of secrecy-good lattices ensures that
I(X¯n;Zn) vanishes exponentially if γΛ(σ) < 2π.
Observe that depending on the choice of Λ, the rate of
extracted randomness can be arbitrarily large.
Remark 3. The asymptotic differential entropy rate of X¯n is
r = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
h(X¯n) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
[logV (Λ)− log(1 + ǫΛ(σx))]
Taking a sequence of secrecy-good lattices such that
γΛ(n)(σ)→ 2π as n→∞, which is compatible with the con-
dition (4), we can obtain the asymptotic rate r = log(√2πσ),
which is only 12 nat from the asymptotic differential entropy
rate of the Gaussian noise Wn (i.e., log(√2πeσ)).
Note that neither nearest-neighbor quantization nor dither
is used in our lattice-hashing scheme, and we only need to
implement the mod R(Λ) operation, which can be performed
in polynomial time for many fundamental regions R(Λ).
In particular, we can choose the fundamental parallelepiped.
Moreover, Remark 2 implies that if the lattice Λ is chosen
randomly in a mod-p ensemble, it is secrecy-good with high
probability, so that one can obtain explicit schemes.
IV. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
From the above discussion, it seems that one can get an
arbitrarily high rate of the secret key, since X¯n is continuous.
However, this is fictitious, because Xn 6= Yn in practice. This
requires Alice and Bob to agree on the key over a public
channel, which will lead to a finite key rate.
ALICE BOB
KEY
GENERATION
QUANTIZER pXYZ DECODER
EVE
K Kˆ
XnX
n
Q Y
n
ZnS S
S
public channel (noiseless)
Fig. 1. Secret key generation in the presence of an eavesdropper with
communication over a public channel.
We consider an i.i.d. memoryless Gaussian source pXYZ
whose components are jointly Gaussian with zero mean. The
distribution is fully described by the variances σ2x, σ2y , σ2z and
the correlation coefficients ρxy, ρxz , ρyz . We can write [3,
Eq. (6)]:
X
n = ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n +Wn1 ,
X
n = ρxz
σx
σz
Z
n +Wn2 ,
(8)
where Wn1 and Wn2 are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian noise vectors
of variances
σ21 = σ
2
x(1− ρ2xy), σ22 = σ2x(1− ρ2xz), (9)
respectively. Further, Wn1 is independent of Yn, and Wn2 is
independent of Zn.
The results of the previous section allow to extract from Xn
a random variable X¯n that is almost statistically independent of
Zn, with σ2 replaced by σ22 . Note that the coefficient ρxzσx/σz
does not affect the argument based on the flatness factor.
However, not all the extracted randomness can be exploited to
generate the key, because Bob has to reconstruct Xn with side
information Yn, which requires Wyner-Ziv coding. Also, in
secret key generation, we are not concerned with the standard
rate-distortion function, but with the error probability of the
key.
We assume that only one round of one-way public commu-
nication (from Alice to Bob) takes place. More precisely, Alice
computes a public message S and a secret key K from her
observation Xn; she then transmits S over the public channel
(see Figure 1). From this message and his own observation
Yn, Bob reconstructs a key Kˆ.
Let Kn and Sn be the sets of secret keys and public
messages respectively. A secret key rate - public rate pair
(RK , RP ) is achievable if there exists a sequence of protocols
with
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn| ≥ RK , lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Sn| ≤ RP ,
such that the following properties hold:
lim
n→∞
log |Kn| −H(K) = 0 (uniformity)
lim
n→∞
P
{
K 6= Kˆ
}
= 0 (reliability)
lim
n→∞
I(K; S,Zn) = 0 (strong secrecy).
To define our key generation scheme, we use the lattice
partition chain Λ1/Λ2/Λ3, where
• Λ1 is quantization-good, which serves as the “source-
code” component of Wyner-Ziv coding;
• Λ2 is AWGN-good, which serves as the “channel-code”
component in Wyner-Ziv coding;
• Λ3 is secrecy-good with respect to σ2, which serves as
the extractor of randomness.
The existence of such a chain of lattices will be shown in
Section V.
We suppose that the lattices are scaled so that their volumes
V1,V2,V3 satisfy
|Λ2/Λ3| = V3
V2
= enRK , |Λ1/Λ2| = V2
V1
= enRP .
The procedure of secret key generation is described as follows:
• Alice quantizes Xn to XnQ = QΛ1(Xn) ∈ Λ1. She then
computes
S = XnQ modV(Λ2),
which belongs to a set of coset leaders of Λ1/Λ2 in
V(Λ2), and transmits its index to Bob. Furthermore, Alice
computes the key
K = QΛ2(X
n
Q) modR(Λ3),
which belongs to a set of coset leaders of Λ2/Λ3 in
R(Λ3). Note that
X
n = EnQ + S+ K+ λ3 (10)
for some λ3 ∈ Λ3, where EnQ = Xn−XnQ ∈ V(Λ1) is the
quantization error.
• Bob receives S and reconstructs
Xˆ
n
Q = S+QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − S
)
.
He then computes his version of the key
Kˆ = QΛ2(Xˆ
n
Q) modR(Λ3).
Note that K and S are functions of X¯n = Xn modR(Λ3):
generalizing [13, Eq. (35)], we have
K = QΛ2(QΛ1(X
n)) modR(Λ3) =
= QΛ2(QΛ1(X
n) modR(Λ3)) modR(Λ3) =
= (QΛ2(QΛ1(X¯
n) modR(Λ3))) modR(Λ3) = f(X¯n);
moreover, it is not hard to see that Xn modV(Λ2) =
X¯n modV(Λ2), and thus
S = QΛ1(X
n modV(Λ2)) modV(Λ2) =
= QΛ1(X¯
n) modV(Λ2) = g(X¯n).
Uniformity: Using the results of the previous section, we
can show that K is almost uniformly distributed on Λ2/Λ3:
from Eq. (10) we have X¯n = Xn modR(Λ3) = (EnQ + S +
K) modR(Λ3), and ∀k ∈ Λ2 ∩R(Λ3),
pK(k) =
∑
s∈Sn
∫
V(k+s)
pX¯n(x¯)dx¯.
where V(k + s) = (V(Λ1) + k + s) modR(Λ3). Using the
bound in Eq. (7), we find that ∀k ∈ Λ2 ∩R(Λ3),∣∣∣∣pK(k)− V2V3
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣pK(k)− 1enRK
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫΛ3(σx)enRK . (11)
Consequently, the entropy of the key is lower bounded by
H(K) ≥
∑
k∈Λ2∩R(Λ3)
pK(k) log
(
enRK
1 + ǫΛ3(σx)
)
=
= nRK − log(1 + ǫΛ3(σx)) ≥ nRK − ǫΛ3(σx).
Strong secrecy: We recall the following bound from [14]:
I(K; S,Zn) ≤ dav log |Kn|
dav
,
where
dav =
∑
k∈Kn
pK(k)V(pSZn|K=k, pSZn),
and V denotes the variational distance.
Observe also that (S,K) → X¯n → Zn is a Markov chain.
Therefore we have
pSZn|K=k(s, z|k) =
pSZnK(s, z, k)
pK(k)
=
=
1
pK(k)
∫
R(Λ3)
pSZnK|X¯n(s, z, k|x¯)pX¯n(x¯)dx¯ =
=
1
pK(k)
∫
R(Λ3)
1{s=g(x¯),k=f(x¯)}pZn|X¯n(z|x¯)pX¯n(x¯)dx¯ =
=
1
pK(k)
∫
V(k+s)
pZnX¯n(z, x¯)dx¯
Similarly,
pSZn(s, z) =
∑
k∈Kn
∫
V(k+s)
pZnX¯n(z, x¯)dx¯.
From the bounds in Eq. (11) and Eq. (6), and noticing that
σ2 ≤ σx in Eq. (9), we find∣∣∣∣∣
∫
V(k+s)
pX¯nZn(x¯, z)dx¯
pK(k)
− pZn(z)
enRP
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4ǫΛ3(σ2)enRP pZn(z),∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈Kn
∫
V(k+s)
pX¯nZn(x¯, z)dx¯ −
pZn(z)
enRP
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫΛ3(σ2)enRP pZn(z)
provided that ǫΛ3(σ2) ≤ 12 . Consequently,
V(pSZn|K=k, pSZn) ≤
∑
s
∫
Rn
5ǫΛ3(σ2)
enRP
pZn(z)dz = 5ǫΛ3(σ2).
Therefore dav ≤ 5ǫΛ3(σ2). If Λ3 is secrecy-good, we find
I(K; S,Zn) ≤ 5ǫΛ3(σ2)(nRK − log 5ǫΛ3(σ2))→ 0.
(Actually, ǫΛ3(σ2) = o
(
1
n
)
is enough.)
Reliability: Let us analyze the error probability P{K 6= Kˆ}.
Note that K = Kˆ if XˆnQ = XnQ. Since XnQ = S+QΛ2(XnQ), we
have
Xˆ
n
Q = X
n
Q ⇐⇒ QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − S
)
= QΛ2(X
n
Q).
Since
QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − S
)
= QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − XnQ +QΛ2(XnQ)
)
= QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − XnQ
)
+QΛ2(X
n
Q)
we derive
Xˆ
n
Q = X
n
Q ⇐⇒ QΛ2
(
ρxy
σx
σy
Y
n − XnQ
)
= 0
⇐⇒ QΛ2(EnQ −Wn1 ) = 0.
When ǫΛ1(σx) and ǫΛ1(ρxyσx) are small, EnQ =
Xn modV(Λ1) is almost uniformly distributed on V(Λ1) and
almost independent of Wn1 . The variance per dimension of
EnQ −Wn1 is asymptotically G(Λ1)V 2/n1 + σ21 , where G(Λ1)
is the normalized second moment. According to [10], if Λ1 is
good for quantization, then the effect of EnQ on the decoding
error probability is subexponential in n relative to the AWGN
of the same power.
By the AWGN-goodness of Λ2, the error probability
P{K 6= Kˆ} ≤ P{QΛ2(EnQ −Wn1 ) 6= 0}
will vanish exponentially as long as
V
2/n
2
1
2pieV
2/n
1 + σ
2
1
> 2πe.
On the other hand, the secrecy-goodness of Λ3 requires
V
2
n
3 /σ
2
2 < 2π. (12)
Therefore, the rate of the secret key is bounded by
RK <
1
n
log
(
V3
V2
)
=
1
2
log
(
σ22
1
2pieV
2/n
1 + σ
2
1
)
− 1
2
. (13)
This corresponds to the rate of public communication
RP =
1
n
log
(
V2
V1
)
>
1
2
log
(
1 +
2πeσ21
V
2/n
1
)
. (14)
If we make Λ1 sufficiently fine such that G(Λ1)V 2/n1 ≪ σ21 ,
then the key rate approaches
RK <
1
2
log
(
σ22
σ21
)
− 1
2
. (15)
For degraded sources, i.e. σ1 < σ2 or equivalently ρxy >
ρxz [3, Lemma 6], the secret key rate is upper-bounded by
I(X;Y) − I(X;Z). The key-rate in Eq. (15) is only 1/2 nat
away from this bound. Achieving this rate requires a high rate
RP of public communication, but Λ1 need to be very fine
in practice. To see this, we substitute 12pieV
2/n
1 = 0.1σ
2
1 in
Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), so that RK is almost the same as in
Eq. (15) while RP > 12 log (1 + 10) ≈ 1.2 nats/dimension.
Note, however, that our scheme does not achieve the optimal
tradeoff between RK and RP identified in [3, Theorem 4] yet.
Achieving the optimal tradeoff will be our future work.
V. EXISTENCE OF A SEQUENCE OF NESTED LATTICES FOR
SECRET KEY GENERATION
We begin by showing the existence of a suitable coarse
lattice Λ3. For the notions of AWGN-good, Rogers-good and
quantization-good lattices we refer the reader to [15, 13].
Following the same reasoning as in [9, Appendix III], it can be
shown that there exists a sequence δn → 0 and an ensemble of
sequences of lattices Λ(n)3 with second moment σ2(Λ
(n)
3 ) =
σ22
e
which are AWGN-good, Rogers-good and quantization-good
and such that
E
[
Θ
Λ
(n)
3
(
1
2πσ22
)]
≤ 1 + δn + (2πσ
2
2)
n
2
V
(n)
3
. (16)
Quantization-goodness then implies that G(Λ(n)3 ) =
σ2(Λ
(n)
3 )/(V
(n)
3 )
2
n → 1/2πe, and consequently V (n)3
tends to 2πσ22 from below, as required to achieve optimal rate
while satisfying the condition in Eq. (12). From the average
bound in Eq. (16), and recalling the relation in Eq. (3)
between theta series and flatness factor, we can deduce the
existence of a sequence Λ(n)3 which is also secrecy-good.
By applying twice the technique in [15, Section VII], and
its extension in [16], we can find two sequences of fine lattices
Λ
(n)
1 , Λ
(n)
2 with Λ
(n)
1 ⊃ Λ(n)2 ⊃ Λ(n)3 which are also Rogers,
quantization and AWGN-good and such that the volume ratios
are arbitrarily close to the bounds in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14).
Note that since ǫΛ′(σ2) ≤ ǫΛ(σ2) whenever Λ ⊂ Λ′, the
lattices Λ(n)2 , Λ
(n)
1 are also secrecy-good with respect to σ2.
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